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Abstract
For the cake-cutting problem, Alijani, et al. [2, 25] and Asano and Umeda [4, 5] gave envy-free and
truthful mechanisms with a small number of cuts, where the desired part of each player’s valuation
function is a single interval on a given cake. In this paper, we give envy-free and truthful mechanisms
with a small number of cuts, which are much simpler than those proposed by Alijani, et al. [2, 25]
and Asano and Umeda [4, 5]. Furthermore, we show that this approach can be applied to the
envy-free and truthful mechanism proposed by Chen, et al. [13], where the valuation function of
each player is more general and piecewise uniform. Thus, we can obtain an envy-free and truthful
mechanism with a small number of cuts even if the valuation function of each player is piecewise
uniform, which solves the future problem posed by Alijani, et al. [2, 25].
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1 Introduction
The problem of dividing a cake among players in a fair manner has attracted the attention of
mathematicians, economists, political scientists and computer scientists [6, 7, 11, 13, 14, 15,
16, 22, 23, 24] since it was first considered by Banach and Knaster [11] and Steinhaus [27, 28].
The cake-cutting problem is often used as a metaphor for prominent real-world problems
that involve the division of a heterogeneous divisible good [10, 14, 26, 32].
Formally, the cake-cutting problem is stated as follows [13]: Given a divisible heterogeneous
cake C represented by an interval [ 0, 1) and n players N = {1, 2, . . . , n} where each player
i ∈ N has a valuation function vi over the cake C, divide the cake C and find an allocation
of the cake C to the players that satisfies one or several fairness criteria. In the cake cutting
literature, one of the most important criteria is envy-freeness [7]. In an envy-free allocation,
each player considers her/his own allocation at least as good as any other player’s allocation.
A piece A of cake C is a finite union of disjoint subintervals X of C. A piece A can also
be viewed as a set of disjoint subintervals X of C. For a general valuation function vi of
player i ∈ N which is integrable or piecewise continuous, the value Vi(A) of a piece A of
cake C for player i can be written by
∫
x∈A vi(x)dx. Thus, the value Vi(A) of the piece A of
disjoint subintervals X of C for player i is Vi(A) =
∑
X∈A Vi(X).
Since general valuation functions may not have a finite discrete representation as an input
to the cake-cutting problem, most algorithms and computational complexity analyses are
based on oracle computation models. Among them a most popular computation model for
general integrable valuation functions is the Robertson-Webb model based on two types of
queries: evaluation and cut [24]. For envy-freeness, Stromquist [23, 30] showed that there is
no finite envy-free cake cutting algorithm that outputs a contiguous allocation to each player
for any n ≥ 3, although an envy-free allocation with a contiguous interval allocation to each
player is guaranteed to exist [29, 31]. Note that any cake cutting algorithm that outputs a
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contiguous allocation to each player uses n − 1 cuts on the cake C. If a contiguous allocation
to each player is not required, Aziz and Mackenzie [6] showed that there is an envy-free cake
cutting algorithm with O(nnn
nn
n
) queries. Procaccia showed that any envy-free cake cutting
algorithm requires Ω(n2) queries [21]. Furthermore, Deng, Qi and Saberi [14] showed that
finding an envy-free allocation using n − 1 cuts on cake C is PPAD-complete when valuation
functions are given explicitly by polynomial-time algorithms, although their result requires
very general (e.g., non-additive, non monotone) valuation functions [18].
In recent papers, some restricted classes of valuation functions have been studied [7, 8,
10, 12, 13, 20]. Piecewise uniform and piecewise constant valuation functions are two special
classes of valuation functions [2, 7, 13, 25]. For a nonnegative valuation function v on cake C,
let D(v) = {x ∈ C | v(x) > 0}. Thus, we can consider that D(v) consists of several disjoint
maximal contiguous intervals. Then v is called piecewise uniform if v(x) = v(y) holds for
all x, y ∈ D(v). Similarly, v is called piecewise constant if, for each contiguous interval I
in D(v), v(x′) = v(x′′) holds for all x′, x′′ ∈ I. Note that v(x) ̸= v(y) may hold for x ∈ I
and y ∈ J when I, J are two distinct maximal contiguous intervals in D(v) of piecewise
constant valuation v. Thus, a piecewise uniform valuation is always piecewise constant. One
of the most important properties of these valuation functions is that they can be described
concisely. Kurokawa, Lai, and Procaccia [19] proved that finding an envy-free allocation in
the Robertson-Webb model when the valuation functions are piecewise uniform is as hard as
solving the problem without any restriction on the valuation functions.
The cake-cutting problem has been studied not only from the viewpoint of computational
complexity but also from the game theoretical point of view [2, 7, 8, 9, 13, 20, 25]. Chen, Lai,
Parkes, and Procaccia [13] considered a strong notion of truthfulness (denoted by strategy-
proofness), in which the players’ dominant strategies are to reveal their true valuations
over the cake. They presented an envy-free and truthful mechanism for the cake-cutting
problem based on maximum flow and minimum cut techniques [34] when the valuation
functions are piecewise uniform. Aziz and Ye [7] considered the problem when valuation
functions are piecewise constant and piecewise uniform. They designed three algorithms
CCEA, MEA, and CSD for piecewise constant valuations, which partially solve an open
problem for piecewise constant valuations posed by Chen et al. in [13]. They showed that
CCEA runs in O(n5M2 log( n
2
M )) time, where M is the number of subintervals defined by the
union of discontinuity points of the players’ piecewise constant valuations (M ≤ 2
∑
i∈N mi
where mi is the number of maximal contiguous intervals in D(vi) = {x ∈ C | vi(x) > 0}
of piecewise constant valuation vi). They also showed that, when CCEA and MEA are
restricted to piecewise uniform valuations, CCEA and MEA become essentially the same
as the mechanism in [13]. However, note that CCEA, MEA and the mechanism in [13] for
dividing the cake use Ω(nM) cuts [2, 25].
Alijani, Farhadi, Ghodsi, Seddighin, and Tajik [2, 25] considered that the number of
cuts is important and considered the following cake-cutting problem by requiring D(vi) =
{x ∈ C | vi(x) > 0} of piecewise uniform valuation vi of each player i ∈ N to be a single
contiguous interval Ci in cake C: Given a divisible heterogeneous cake C, n strategic players
N = {1, 2, . . . , n} with valuation interval Ci ⊆ C of each player i ∈ N , find a mechanism
for dividing C into pieces and allocating pieces of C to n players N to meet the following
conditions: (i) the mechanism is envy-free; (ii) the mechanism is truthful; and (iii) the
number of cuts made on cake C is small. And they gave an envy-free and truthful mechanism
with at most 2n − 2 cuts [2, 25], although their original mechanism is not actually envy
free [5] and corrected later by themselves. Asano and Umeda [4, 5] also gave an alternative
envy-free and truthful mechanism with at most 2n − 2 cuts.
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In this paper, we give envy-free and truthful mechanisms with a small number of cuts,
which lead to a much simpler mechanism than those proposed by Alijani, et al. [2, 25]
and Asano and Umeda [4, 5]. Thus, we can obtain a much simpler envy-free and truthful
mechanism with at most 2n − 2 cuts which runs in O(n3) time for the above cake-cutting
problem. Furthermore, we show that this approach can be applied to the envy-free and
truthful mechanism proposed by Chen, et al. [13] for the more general cake-cutting problem
where the valuation function vi of each player i ∈ N is piecewise uniform. Thus, this approach
can make their envy-free and truthful mechanism use at most 2M − 2 cuts and we solve the
open problem posed by Alijani, et al. [2, 25], where M ≤ 2
∑
i∈N mi and mi is the number
of maximal contiguous intervals in D(vi) = {x ∈ C | vi(x) > 0} of vi as mentioned above.
2 Preliminaries
We are given a divisible heterogeneous cake C = [ 0, 1) = {x | 0 ≤ x < 1}1, n strategic players
N = {1, 2, . . . , n} with valuation interval Ci = [αi, βi) = {x | 0 ≤ αi ≤ x < βi ≤ 1} ⊆ C
of each player i ∈ N . We denote by CN the (multi-) set of valuation intervals of all the
players N , i.e., CN = (C1, C2, . . . , Cn). We also write CN = (Ci : i ∈ N). Valuation intervals
CN is called solid, if, for every x ∈ C, there is a player i ∈ N whose valuation interval
Ci ∈ CN contains x. As in [2, 4, 7, 25], we will assume that CN is solid, i.e.,
⋃
Ci∈CN Ci = C,
throughout this paper.
A union X of mutual disjoint sets X1, X2, . . . , Xk is denoted by X = X1 +X2 + · · ·+Xk =∑k
ℓ=1 Xℓ. A piece Ai of cake C is a union of mutually disjoint subintervals Ai1 , Ai2 , . . . , Aiki
of C. Thus, Ai = Ai1 + Ai2 + · · · + Aiki =
∑ki
ℓ=1 Aiℓ . A partition AN = (A1, A2, . . . , An) of
cake C into n disjoint pieces A1, A2, . . . , An is called an allocation of C to n players N if each
piece Ai =
∑ki
ℓ=1 Aiℓ is allocated to player i ∈ N . We also write AN = (Ai : i ∈ N). Thus, in
allocation AN = (Ai : i ∈ N) of C to n players N ,
∑
i∈N Ai = C holds and Ai =
∑ki
ℓ=1 Aiℓ
is called an allocated piece of C to player i ∈ N .
For an interval X = [x′, x′′), we denote by cl(X) the closure of X and thus cl(X) =
[x′, x′′] = {x | x′ ≤ x ≤ x′′}. For an interval X = [x′, x′′) of C, the length of X, denoted by
len(X), is defined by x′′ −x′. For a piece A =
∑k
ℓ=1 Xℓ of cake C, the length of A, denoted by
len(A), is defined by the total sum of len(Xℓ), i.e., len(A) =
∑k
ℓ=1 len(Xℓ). For each i ∈ N
and valuation interval Ci of player i, the value of piece A =
∑k
ℓ=1 Xℓ for player i, denoted by
Vi(A), is the total sum of len(Xℓ ∩ Ci), i.e., Vi(A) =
∑k
ℓ=1 len(Xℓ ∩ Ci). For an allocation
AN = (Ai : i ∈ N) of cake C to n players N , if Vi(Ai) ≥ Vi(Aj) for all j ∈ N , then the
allocated piece Ai to player i is called envy-free for player i. If, for every player i ∈ N , the
allocated piece Ai to player i is envy-free for player i, then the allocation AN = (Ai : i ∈ N)
to n players N is called envy-free.
Let M be a mechanism (i.e., a polynomial-time algorithm in this paper) for the cake-
cutting problem. Let CN = (Ci : i ∈ N) be an arbitrary input to M and AN = (Ai : i ∈ N)
be an allocation of cake C to n players N obtained by M. If AN = (Ai : i ∈ N) for every
input CN = (Ci : i ∈ N) to M is envy-free then M is called envy-free.
Now, assume that only player i ∈ N gives a false valuation interval C ′i and let C′N (i) =
(C ′j : j ∈ N) (all the other players j ≠ i give true valuation intervals Cj and thus C ′j = Cj
for each j ̸= i) be an input to M and let an allocation of cake C to n players N obtained
1 We assume C = [ 0, 1) = {x | 0 ≤ x < 1}. We also assume, if an interval X = [x′, x′′) = {x | x′ ≤ x < x′′}
of C = [ 0, 1) is cut at y ∈ X with x′ < y < x′′ then X is divided into two subintervals X ′ = [x′, y) and
X ′′ = [y, x′′).
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by M be A′N (i) = (A′j : j ∈ N). The values of Ai =
∑ki






player i are Vi(Ai) =
∑ki
ℓ=1 len(Aiℓ ∩ Ci) and Vi(A′i) =
∑k′i
ℓ=1 len(A′iℓ ∩ Ci) (note that
Vi(A′i) ̸=
∑k′i
ℓ=1 len(A′iℓ ∩ C
′
i)). If Vi(Ai) ≥ Vi(A′i), then there is no merit for player i to give
false C ′i and player i will report true valuation interval Ci to M. For each player i ∈ N , if
this holds for all such C ′is, then M is called truthful (allocation AN = (Ai : i ∈ N) obtained
by M is also called truthful ).
For valuation intervals CN = (Ci : i ∈ N) and an interval X = [x′, x′′) of cake C, let
N(X) be the set of players i in N whose valuation interval Ci is contained in X and let
CN(X) be the (multi-) set of valuation intervals in CN which are contained in X. Thus,
N(X) = {i ∈ N | Ci ⊆ X, Ci ∈ CN } and CN(X) = (Ci ∈ CN : i ∈ N(X)). The density of
interval X = [x′, x′′) of C, denoted by ρ(X), is defined by ρ(X) = len(X)|N(X)| =
x′′−x′
|N(X)| . The
density ρ(X) is the average length of pieces of the players in N(X) when the part X of
cake C is divided among the players in N(X). Let X be the set of all nonempty intervals
in C. Let ρmin be the minimum density among the densities of all nonempty intervals in
C, i.e., ρmin = minX∈X ρ(X). Let Xmin = {X ∈ X | ρ(X) = ρmin}. Thus, Xmin is the set
of all intervals of minimum density in C. Note that, for each interval X = [ x′, x′′) ∈ Xmin,
there are valuation intervals Ci = [ αi, βi), Cj = [ αj , βj) ∈ CN with x′ = αi and x′′ = βj .
Thus, the set of all intervals of minimum density in C can be computed in O(n2) time. An
interval X ∈ Xmin is called a maximal interval of minimum density if no other interval of
Xmin contains X properly. A minimal interval of minimum density is similarly defined.
3 Core Mechanism M1
For cake C = [ 0, 1), n strategic players N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, and solid valuation intervals
CN = (Ci : i ∈ N) with Ci = [αi, βi) ⊆ C of each player i ∈ N , each mechanism M in [2, 25]
and [4, 5] uses a small number of cuts and finds an allocation AN = (Ai : i ∈ N) to players
N satisfying the following: (a) M is envy-free; (b) M is truthful; (c) Ai ⊆ Ci for each i ∈ N ;
and (d)
∑
i∈N Ai = C. However, their mechanisms were quite complicated.
In this paper, we give a much simpler envy-free and truthful mechanism with a small
number of cuts. For this purpose, we first give a core mechanism M1 which assumes that
cake C = [ 0, 1) is an interval of minimum density ρmin in C = [ 0, 1) (thus, ρmin = 1n ).
Algorithm 1 Core Mechanism M1.
Input: Cake C = [ 0, 1), n players N = {1, 2, . . . , n} and solid valuation intervals
CN = (Ci : i ∈ N) with valuation interval Ci = [αi, βi) ⊆ C of each player
i ∈ N and
⋃
Ci∈CN Ci = C, where C = [ 0, 1) is an interval of minimum
density ρmin = 1n in cake C = [ 0, 1).
Output: Allocation AN = (Ai : i ∈ N) with Ai ⊆ Ci, len(Ai) = ρmin for each
i ∈ N and
∑
i∈N Ai = C.
sort CN = (Ci : i ∈ N) in a lexicographic order with respect to (βi, αi) and assume
C1 ≤ C2 ≤ · · · ≤ Cn in this lexicographic order;
set A1 = [a1, b1) ⊆ C1 with length ρmin such that a1 = α1 and b1 = α1 + ρmin;
for i = 2 to n do
set Ai = [ai, bi) \
∑i−1
ℓ=1 Aℓ with length ρmin such that [ai, bi) ⊆ Ci and ai is the
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Figure 1 (a) Solid valuation intervals CN = (Ci : i ∈ N) with ρ(C) = ρmin = 0.2. (b) Allocation
AN = (Ai : i ∈ N) obtained by M1.
Figure 1 shows an example of solid valuation intervals CN = (Ci : i ∈ N) with ρ(C) =
ρmin = 0.2 and an allocation AN = (Ai : i ∈ N) obtained by M1.
▶ Theorem 1. For cake C = [ 0, 1), n players N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, and solid valuation
intervals CN = (Ci : i ∈ N) with valuation interval Ci = [αi, βi) of each player i ∈ N and⋃
Ci∈CN Ci = C, let C = [ 0, 1) be an interval of minimum density ρmin =
1
n in cake C = [ 0, 1).
Then, M1 finds an allocation AN = (Ai : i ∈ N) with Ai ⊆ Ci and len(Ai) = ρmin for each
i ∈ N and
∑
i∈N Ai = C in O(n log n) time. Furthermore, the number of cuts made by M1
on cake C is at most 2n − 2.
Proof. The number of cuts made on cake C is clearly at most 2n − 2, since M1 uses at
most two cuts at ai and bi for each i ∈ N to obtain Ai and no cut is required at 0, 1 of
cake C = [ 0, 1). Similarly, it can be easily shown that M1 runs in O(n log n) time, since
lexicographical sorting of CN = (Ci : i ∈ N) requires O(n log n) time and ai, bi for each i ∈ N
can be found in O(log n) time based on appropriate data structures.
We next prove the proposition that M1 correctly finds an allocation AN = (Ai : i ∈ N)
with Ai ⊆ Ci and len(Ai) = ρmin for each i ∈ N and
∑
i∈N Ai = C by induction on n.
If n = 1 then the proposition is clearly true.
Now we assume that the proposition is true for n − 1 players and consider n ≥ 2 players.
Of course, A1 = [a1, b1) ⊆ C1 = [α1, β1) with a1 = α1 and b1 = α1 + ρmin (thus of length
ρmin) is allocated to player 1, since ρ(C1) ≥ ρmin and thus the length of C1 is β1 − α1 ≥ ρmin.
Then we delete A1 = [a1, b1) and virtually consider a1 = b1 (we call this as virtual shrinking
of hollow interval A1 after deletion of A1). Note that, since we performed virtual shrinking of
hollow interval A1 = [a1, b1) and virtually considered a1 = b1, the remaining cake C ′ = C \A1
may be considered as a single interval and each C ′k = Ck \ A1 (k ∈ N \ {1}) may also be
considered as a single interval. Thus, the resulting cake-cutting problem may be considered
to be the same as the original cake-cutting problem, that is, it consists of cake C ′ = C \ A1
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which is a single interval, players N ′ = N \ {1}, and valuation intervals C′N ′ with a single





C ′i = C ′) also holds, which can be obtained as follows.
If α1 > 0 then there is a valuation interval Cj = [αj , βj) ∈ CN with αj = 0 and βj ≥ β1 by
the solidness of CN (i.e.,
⋃






C ′i = C ′.
If α1 = 0 then let α = min{αi | Ci = [αi, βi) ∈ CN \ {C1}} < 1. Then we have α ≤ ρmin,
since if α > ρmin then, for interval X = [α, 1), we would have N(X) = N ′ = N \ {1} and
ρ(X) = len(X)|N(X)| =
1−α
n−1 < ρmin by ρmin =
1
n , a contradiction since ρmin is the minimum density





C ′i = C ′ even if α1 = 0.
The density ρ′ of intervals in this resulting cake-cutting problem can be easily shown
to satisfy ρ′(X ′) ≥ ρmin for each nonempty interval X ′ of C ′ and ρ′(C ′) = ρmin. Actually,








n = ρmin. Each nonempty interval X
′ ⊆ C ′ can be
written by X ′ = X \ A1 for some interval X = [x′, x′′) ⊆ C. Let Y = X ′ ∪ A1 = X ∪ A1 (it
is possible that there are many X, but Y is uniquely determined). Of course, X ′ = Y \ A1.
If Y is not a single interval of C, then cl(X) ∩ cl(A1) = [x′, x′′] ∩ [α1, α1 + ρmin] = ∅ (i.e.,
x′ < x′′ < α1 < α1 + ρmin or α1 < α1 + ρmin < x′ < x′′), which implies that there is unique
X ⊆ C with X ′ = X \ A1 = Y \ A1 = X and ρ′(X ′) = ρ(X) ≥ ρmin.
Thus, we can assume that Y is a single interval Y = [y′, y′′) of C with y′ ≤ α1 <
α1 + ρmin ≤ y′′ by A1 = [α1, α1 + ρmin) ⊆ Y = X ∪ A1. For each k ∈ N ′ = N \ {1} and
Ck = [αk, βk) ∈ CN , if Ck ⊆ Y , then we have ∅ ≠ C ′k = Ck \ A1 ∈ C′N ′ and C ′k ⊆ X ′ = Y \ A1
(since if Ck ⊆ A1 then βk ≤ α1 + ρmin ≤ β1 by A1 = [α1, α1 + ρmin) ⊆ C1 = [α1, β1) and we
would have βk = α1+ρmin = β1 and A1 = C1 by the fact that CN = (Ci : i ∈ N) was sorted in
a lexicographic order with respect to (βi, αi), and thus ρ(A1) ≤ 12 ρmin < ρmin, a contradiction).
Similarly, if Ck ̸⊆ Y , then it is clear that ∅ ≠ C ′k = Ck \ A1 ∈ C′N ′ and C ′k ̸⊆ X ′ = Y \ A1.
Thus, N ′(X ′) = {k ∈ N ′ | C ′k ∈ C′N ′ , C ′k ⊆ X ′} = {k ∈ N \ {1} | Ck ∈ CN , Ck ⊆ Y } =
N(Y ) \ {1}. This implies |N ′(X ′)| = |N(Y )| − 1 or |N ′(X ′)| = |N(Y )|. If 1 ̸∈ N(Y ) (i.e.,
if C1 = [α1, β1) ̸⊆ Y = [y′, y′′)) then y′′ < β1 by y′ ≤ α1 and we have N(Y ) = ∅ since
CN = (Ci : i ∈ N) was sorted in a lexicographic order with respect to (βi, αi). Thus, if
1 ̸∈ N(Y ) then |N ′(X ′)| = |N(Y )| = 0 and ρ′(X ′) = len(X
′)
|N ′(X′)| = ∞ ≥ ρmin. Now, assume
1 ∈ N(Y ). Then, |N ′(X ′)| = |N(Y )| − 1 and, by len(Y ) = |N(Y )|ρ(Y ) and ρ(Y ) ≥ ρmin, we








|N(Y )|−1 = ρmin.
Thus, since we performed virtual shrinking of hollow interval A1 = [a1, b1) and virtually
considered a1 = b1, the resulting cake-cutting problem with density ρ′ may be considered to
be the same as the original cake-cutting problem, that is, it consists of cake C ′ = C \ A1
which is a single interval of length 1− 1n and ρ
′(C ′) = ρ′min = ρmin = 1n , players N
′ = N \{1},
and solid valuation intervals C′N ′ with a single interval C ′k = Ck \ A1 ⊆ C ′ of each remaining






C ′i = C ′. Note that the lexicographic order of C′N ′ is the same
as that of CN ′ and C ′2 ≤ · · · ≤ C ′n holds. Note also that, if we consider the cake C ′ of
length 1 − 1n as being of length 1 by virtually multiplying
n
n−1 then the minimum density
ρ′min = ρmin = 1n will become ρ
′
min = 1n−1 and we can use induction hypothesis as usual.
By induction hypothesis, the proposition is true in the resulting cake-cutting problem
and we can obtain an allocation A′N ′ = (A′i : i ∈ N ′) with A′i ⊆ C ′i and len(A′i) = ρmin for




i = C ′. From A′N ′ = (A′i : i ∈ N ′), we can obtain an allocation
AN = (Ai : i ∈ N) with Ai ⊆ Ci and len(Ai) = ρmin for each i ∈ N ′ as follows: if A′i = [a′i, b′i)
contains the virtually shrunken interval A1 = [a1, b1) then let Ai = [ai, a1) + [b1, bi) by
considering a1 ≠ b1; otherwise, let Ai = A′i. This is called inverse virtual shrinking of A1.
Thus, the proposition is true for n players. ◀
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4 Application to Mechanism of Asano and Umeda [4]
For a given input of cake C = [ 0, 1), n players N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, and solid valuation intervals
CN = (Ci : i ∈ N) with valuation interval Ci = [ αi, βi) of each player i ∈ N , the mechanism
of Asano and Umeda [4] first finds all the maximal intervals of minimum density ρmin. Let
H1 = [ h′1, h′′1), . . . , HL = [ h′L, h′′L) be all the maximal intervals of minimum density ρmin in
cake C = [ 0, 1). Their mechanism then cuts cake C = [ 0, 1) at both endpoints of each Hℓ
(ℓ = 1, . . . , L). As shown in [4], the closures of two distinct maximal intervals of minimum
density are disjoint and these cuts at both endpoints of each maximal interval of minimum
density can be done independently. By these cuts, the original cake-cutting problem is
reduced into two types of cake-cutting subproblems of type (i) and type (ii) as follows:
(i) the cake-cutting problem within each maximal interval Hℓ = [ h′ℓ, h′′ℓ ) (ℓ = 1, . . . , L) of
minimum density (which consists of cake Hℓ, players N(Hℓ) whose valuation intervals
are in Hℓ and valuations CN(Hℓ) with density ρ); and
(ii) the cake-cutting problem obtained by deleting all Hℓ = [ h′ℓ, h′′ℓ ) (ℓ = 1, . . . , L), i.e., the
cake-cutting problem for cake C ′ = C \
∑L
ℓ=1 Hℓ, players N ′ = N \
∑L
ℓ=1 N(Hℓ) and
valuations C′N ′ (which consists of valuations C ′k = Ck \
∑L
ℓ=1 Hℓ ̸= ∅ for all k ∈ N ′)






C ′k = C ′.
Note that the cake-cutting problem of type (i) is almost the same as the original cake-cutting
problem, since cake Hℓ is a single interval, each valuation Ck ∈ CN(Hℓ) is also a single interval,
and the valuation intervals CN(Hℓ) is solid as shown in [4]. Thus, based on the core mechanism
M1 (Algorithm 1), for each ℓ = 1, . . . , L, we can find an allocation AN(Hℓ) = (Ai : i ∈ N(Hℓ))
with Ai ⊆ Ci and len(Ai) = ρmin for each i ∈ N(Hℓ) and
∑
i∈N(Hℓ) Ai = Hℓ.
On the other hand, the cake-cutting problem of type (ii) is different from the original cake-
cutting problem, because the resulting cake C ′ = C \
∑L
ℓ=1 Hℓ may become a set of two or
more disjoint intervals and each remaining valuation C ′k = Ck \
∑L
ℓ=1 Hℓ ̸= ∅ may also become
a set of two or more disjoint intervals. However, the cake-cutting problem of type (ii) can be
solved in almost the same way by virtually shrinking all Hℓ. That is, we virtually shrink each
hollow interval Hℓ = [ h′ℓ, h′′ℓ ) (since Hℓ was already deleted) and virtually consider h′ℓ = h′′ℓ .
By virtually shrinking of all Hℓ = [ h′ℓ, h′′ℓ ), cake C ′ = C \
∑L
ℓ=1 Hℓ becomes a single interval
C ′(S), players N ′ = N \
∑L
ℓ=1 N(Hℓ) remains the same, each valuation C ′k ∈ C′N ′ becomes a
single interval C ′(S)k of C ′(S), and the valuation intervals C
′(S)
N ′ = (C
′(S)





k = C ′(S)). Thus, by virtually shrinking of all Hℓ, the cake-cutting
problem of type (ii) above can be reduced to the cake-cutting problem of type (i) for cake
C ′(S), players N ′ = N \
∑L
ℓ=1 N(Hℓ), solid valuation intervals C
′(S)
N ′ = (C
′(S)





k = C ′(S) and the same density ρ′(S) = ρ′, which can be solved recursively.
Note that, if ρ(C) > ρmin then the minimum density ρ′min of intervals in the cake-cutting
problem of type (ii) satisfies ρ′min > ρmin as shown in [4, 5].
From an allocation A′(S)N ′ = (A
′(S)
k : k ∈ N ′) to players N ′ where A
′(S)
k is the allocated






k = C ′(S), we obtain
an allocation A′N ′ = (A′k : k ∈ N ′) to players N ′ where A′k is the allocated piece of cake C ′ to




k = C ′ as follows: if A
′(S)
k contains a shrunken interval
H
(S)
ℓ of hollow interval Hℓ, then let A′k be the set of disjoint intervals obtained from A
′(S)
k by
restoring each shrunken interval H(S)ℓ in A
′(S)
k to the original hollow interval Hℓ = [ h′ℓ, h′′ℓ );
otherwise, let A′k = A
′(S)
k . They called this inverse shrinking of all Hℓ (ℓ = 1, . . . , L) in [4].
We call the method based on the core mechanism M1 (Algorithm 1) described above the
modified mechanism of Asano and Umeda. The details are in Section 5. Note that all the
maximal intervals of minimum density ρmin can be obtained in O(n2) time, since there are
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4 [0.1,0.15) [0.45,0.5)A = +
1 [0.15,0.25)A =
6 [0,0.1) [0.5,0.55)A = +
8 [0.8,1)A =




Figure 2 (a) Example of CN = (Ci : i ∈ N). (b) The maximal intervals H1, H2 of minimum
density ρmin = 0.1, with N(H1) = {1, 2, 3, 4}, AN(H1) = (Ai : i ∈ N(H1)), N(H2) = {5}, AN(H2)
=(A5) in the 1st iteration.
at most 2n endpoints of the valuation intervals in CN and the endpoints of each interval of
minimum density are endpoints of some valuation intervals. The number of cuts made over
C is also at most 2n − 2. Envy-freeness and truthfulness will be given in Section 5, although
they were given in [5] (also given in [2, 13, 25]). Thus, the following theorem holds as in [4].
▶ Theorem 2. The modified mechanism of Asano and Umeda correctly finds, in O(n3) time,
an envy-free and truthful allocation AN = (Ai : i ∈ N) of cake C to n players N with Ai ⊆ Ci
for each player i ∈ N and
∑
i∈N Ai = C. Furthermore, the number of cuts made over C by
the mechanism is at most 2n − 2.
For an input example in Figure 2(a), the modified mechanism of Asano and Umeda works
as shown in Figure 2(b) and Figure 3.
5 Details of Modified Mechanism of Asano and Umeda
As we described in Section 4, Mechanism of Asano and Umeda [4] can be significantly
simplified based on M1 (Algorithm 1). Actually, M1 can be slightly modified and used as













































4 [0.1,0.15) [0.45,0.5)A = +
1 [0.15,0.25)A =
6 [0,0.1) [0.5,0.55)A = +
8 [0.8,1)A =




Figure 3 The second and third iterations for the example in Figure 2. In the second iteration,
the minimum density is ρmin = 0.15 and N(H1) = {6, 7}, A6 = [0, 0.1) + [0.5, 0.55) and A7 =
[0.55, 0.65) + [0.75, 0.8). In the third (last) iteration, the minimum density is ρmin = 0.2 and
N(H1) = {8} and A8 = [0.8, 1).
Procedure CutMaxInterval(R, H, DR).
Input: Cake H = [h′, h′′), players R and solid valuation intervals DR = (Di : i ∈ R)
with valuation interval Di = [α′i, β′i) ⊆ H of each player i ∈ R and⋃
Di∈DR Di = H, where H is an interval of minimum density ρmin in H.
Output: Allocation AR = (Ai : i ∈ R) with Ai ⊆ Di and len(Ai) = ρmin for each
i ∈ R and
∑
i∈R Ai = H.
sort DR = (Di = [α′i, β′i) : i ∈ R) in a lexicographic order with respect to (β′i, α′i) and
assume R = {r1, r2, . . . , r|R|} and Dr1 ≤ Dr2 ≤ · · · ≤ Dr|R| in this order;
set Ar1 = [ar1 , br1) ⊆ Dr1 with length ρmin such that ar1 = α′r1 and br1 = α
′
r1 + ρmin;
for i = 2 to |R| do
set Ari = [ari , bri) \
∑i−1
ℓ=1 Arℓ with length ρmin such that [ari , bri) ⊆ Dri and
ari is the leftmost endpoint in Dri \
∑i−1
ℓ=1 Arℓ ;
Thus, our modified mechanism of Asano and Umeda can be written as follows (we omit
inverse virtual shrinking).
Algorithm 2 Modified Mechanism of Asano and Umeda.
Input: Cake C = [ 0, 1), n players N = {1, 2, . . . , n} and solid valuation intervals
CN = (Ci : i ∈ N) with valuation interval Ci = [αi, βi) ⊆ C of each player
i ∈ N and
⋃
Ci∈CN Ci = C.
Output: Allocation AN = (Ai : i ∈ N) with Ai ⊆ Ci for i ∈ N and
∑
i∈N Ai = C.
CutCake(N, C, CN );
Now we will give a proof of envy-freeness and truthfulness of Modified Mechanism of
Asano and Umeda (Alogorithm 2) described in Theorem 2, which is almost the same as given
in [13, 25].
Let T be the number of recursive calls CutCake(·, ·, ·) in Modified Mechanism of As-
ano and Umeda (Algorithm 2). Note that, although we use D(S), D(S)k ∈ D
(S)
P ′ , D
(S)
P ′ in
CutCake(P ′, D(S), D(S)P ′ ) which are obtained from D′, D′k ∈ D′P ′ , D′P ′ by virtual shrinking of
all H1, . . . , HL, we will not distinguish them from now on, since we just performed virtual
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Procedure CutCake(P, D, DP ).
Input: Cake D which can be considered to be a single interval, players P , and solid
valuation intervals DP = (Di : i ∈ P ) with valuation interval
Di = [α′i, β′i) ⊆ D of each player i ∈ P and
⋃
Di∈DP Di = D (the density of
each interval X of D is denoted by ρ(X)).
Output: Allocation AP = (Ai : i ∈ P ) with Ai ⊆ Di for i ∈ P and
∑
i∈P Ai = D.
Find all the maximal intervals of minimum density ρmin in the cake-cutting problem
with cake D, players P and solid valuation intervals DP ;
Let H1 = [h′1, h′′1), . . . , HL = [h′L, h′′L) be all the maximal intervals of minimum
density ρmin;
for ℓ = 1 to L do
cut cake D at both endpoints h′ℓ, h′′ℓ of Hℓ;
Rℓ = {k ∈ P | Dk ⊆ Hℓ, Dk ∈ DP }; DRℓ = (Dk ∈ DP : k ∈ Rℓ);
CutMaxInterval(Rℓ, Hℓ, DRℓ);
P ′ = P ; D′ = D;
for ℓ = 1 to L do P ′ = P ′ \ Rℓ; D′ = D′ \ Hℓ;
// P ′ = P \
∑L
ℓ=1 Rℓ and D′ = D \
∑L
ℓ=1 Hℓ
if P ′ ̸= ∅ then
D′P ′ = ∅;
for each Dk ∈ DP with k ∈ P ′ do D′k = Dk \
∑L
ℓ=1 Hℓ; D′P ′ = D′P ′ + {D′k};
Let D(S), D(S)k ∈ D
(S)
P ′ , D
(S)
P ′ be obtained from D′, D′k ∈ D′P ′ , D′P ′ by virtual
shrinking of all H1, . . . , HL;
CutCake(P ′, D(S), D(S)P ′ );
shrinking. Thus, we consider D(S) = D′, (D(S)k ∈ D
(S)
P ′ ) = (D′k ∈ D′P ′) and D
(S)
P ′ = D′P ′ . We
denote by CutCake(P (t), D(t), DP (t)) the t-th recursive call of CutCake(·, ·, ·). Note that the
first call of CutCake(·, ·, ·) is CutCake(N, C, CN ). Let ρ(t)min be the minimum density of the
cake cutting problem with cake D(t), players P (t) and the solid valuation intervals DP (t) .
Clearly, C = D(1) ⊃ D(2) ⊃ · · · ⊃ D(T ) and N = P (1) ⊃ P (2) ⊃ · · · ⊃ P (T ). Furthermore, as





min < · · · < ρ
(T )
min




) the CutMaxInterval(·, ·, ·) called in
CutCake(P (t), D(t), DP (t)), where H
(t)
ℓ is a maximal interval of minimum density ρ
(t)
min in
cake D(t), players P (t) and solid valuation intervals DP (t) by virtualy shrinking of hollow
pieces in C \ D(t). For each player i ∈ N , there is t ∈ {1, . . . , T} such that allocation Ai ⊆ Ci




). Thus, it is clear that Modified
Mechanism of Asano and Umeda (Algorithm 2) finds an allocation AN = (Ai : i ∈ N) of
cake C to n players N with Ai ⊆ Ci for each player i ∈ N and
∑
i∈N Ai = C.
Envy-freeness can be proved as follows (which is almost the same as given in [13, 25]).




) called in the
t-th recursive call CutCake(P (t), D(t), DP (t)). Thus, Vi(Ai) = len(Ai) = ρ
(t)
min. Similarly,







the t′-th recursive call CutCake(P (t′), D(t′), DP (t′)). If t′ ≤ t then Vi(Aj) = len(Aj ∩




min = len(Ai) = Vi(Ai). Otherwise (i.e., if t′ > t), although




min = len(Ai) = Vi(Ai), we have Aj ∩ Ci = ∅ and Vi(Aj) =
len(Aj ∩ Ci) = 0 ≤ ρ(t)min = len(Ai) = Vi(Ai). Thus, envy-freeness is clear.
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Truthfulness can be proved as follows. Assume that only player i ∈ N gives a false
valuation interval C ′i and let C′N (i) = (C ′j : j ∈ N) be an input to Modified Mechanism
of Asano and Umeda (Algorithm 2) and A′N (i) = (A′j : j ∈ N) be the obtained allocation
of cake C to n players N (in the argument below, we assume that C′N (i) = (C ′j : j ∈ N)
is solid, although this restriction can be removed by a little more complicated argument).




) called in the











) called in the t′-th re-
cursive call CutCake(P ′(t′), D′(t′), D′
P ′(t′)
). Thus, Vi(Ai) = len(Ai) = ρ(t)min and Vi(A′i) =∑k′i
ℓ′=1 len(A′iℓ′ ∩ Ci) ≤
∑k′i
ℓ′=1 len(A′iℓ′ ) = ρ
′ (t′)
min , where ρ
′ (t′)
min is the minimum density of
the intervals in cake D′(t′) with P ′(t′) and D′
P ′(t′)



















ℓ′=1 len(A′iℓ′ ) ≥
∑k′i







min. In this case, t′ ≥ t holds, which can be shown as follows.
Suppose contrarily that t′ < t. Then for two inputs CN = (Cj : j ∈ N) and C′N (i) = (C ′j :
j ∈ N), Modified Mechanism of Asano and Umeda (Algorithm 2) makes the same behavior









i } = DP (t′′) \ {D
(t′′)
i } for each
t′′ = 1, . . . , t′, where D(t
′′)
i = Ci ∩ D(t
′′) and D′ (t
′′)
i = C ′i ∩ D
′(t′′). Let X = [x′, x′′) be
a maximal interval of minimum density ρ(t
′)
min in D(t





i = Ci ∩ D(t
′) ̸⊆ X, since otherwise (i.e., if D(t
′)
i ⊆ X) Ai to player i would
be determined in the t′-th recursive call CutCake(P (t′), D(t′), DP (t′)), which is a contadiction
(since t > t′ and Ai is determined in the t-th call CutCake(P (t), D(t), DP (t))). Thus, if
D′
(t′)
i = C ′i ∩ D
′(t′) ̸⊆ X then ρ′ (t′)(X) = ρ(t′)(X) holds by D(t
′)
i ̸⊆ X, and otherwise (i.e., if
D′
(t′)
i ⊆ X) ρ′ (t
′)(X) < ρ(t′)(X) holds by D(t
′)




min ≤ ρ′ (t









min in this case.




min. As we mentioned above, for two inputs
CN = (Cj : j ∈ N) and C′N (i) = (C ′j : j ∈ N), Modified Mechanism of Asano and Umeda (Al-
gorithm 2) makes the same behavior before the t-th recursive calls CutCake(P (t), D(t), DP (t))
and CutCake(P ′(t), D′(t), D′
P ′(t)
). Thus, P ′(t) = P (t), D′(t) = D(t) and D′
P ′(t)
\ {D′ (t)i } =
DP (t) \ {D
(t)
i }, where D
(t)
i = Ci ∩ D(t) and D
′ (t)
i = C ′i ∩ D
′(t). For each player j ∈ N with Aj




) in the t-th call CutCake(P (t), D(t), DP (t)),








We will show that ρ′ (t)min ≥ ρ
(t)







Now we assume t′ > t. Let X = [x′, x′′) be a maximal interval of minimum density ρ′ (t)min
in D′(t) = D(t). Thus, ρ′ (t)(X) = ρ′ (t)min. Furthermore, D
′ (t)
i = C ′i ∩ D
′(t) ̸⊆ X holds, since
otherwise (i.e., if D′ (t)i ⊆ X) A′i to player i would be determined in the t-th recursive
call CutCake(P ′(t), D′(t), D′
P ′(t)
) and t′ = t (which contradicts t′ > t). Thus, if D(t)i =
Ci ∩ D(t) ̸⊆ X, then ρ′ (t)(X) = ρ(t)(X) by D′ (t)i ̸⊆ X and ρ
′ (t)
min = ρ′ (t)(X) = ρ(t)(X) ≥ ρ
(t)
min.
If D(t)i ⊆ X, then ρ′ (t)(X) > ρ(t)(X) by D
′ (t)
i ̸⊆ X and ρ
′ (t)
min = ρ′ (t)(X) > ρ(t)(X) ≥ ρ
(t)
min.
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min and A′j ⊆ Cj∩D
′(t) =










Cj) ∩ D(t) = H(t)ℓ , we have
Vi(A′i) = len(A′i ∩ Ci) = len(A′i ∩ Ci ∩ D(t))

























ℓ | − 1)
= ρ(t)min = Vi(Ai).
Thus, truthfulness of Modified Mechanism of Asano and Umeda (Algorithm 2) is proved.
6 Second Mechanism M2
In this section, we give the second version M2 which can be applied to the envy-free and
truthful mechanism proposed by Chen, et al. [13] where the valuation function of each
player is more general and piecewise uniform. We are given a cake C = [ 0, 1), n players
N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, and solid valuation intervals CN = (Ci : i ∈ N) with valuation interval
Ci = [αi, βi) ⊆ C of each player i ∈ N as before. We are also given (si : i ∈ N) such that
there is an allocation A′N = (A′i : i ∈ N) to players N with A′i ⊆ Ci and si = len(A′i) > 0 for




i = C (thus
∑
i∈N si = 1). Note that there is no need to have such
an allocation A′N = (A′i : i ∈ N) in hand.
Then M2 is almost the same as M1 and can be written as follows.
Algorithm 3 Second Mechanism M2.
Input: Cake C = [ 0, 1), n players N = {1, 2, . . . , n} and solid valuation intervals
CN = (Ci : i ∈ N) with valuation interval Ci = [αi, βi) of each player i ∈ N
and
⋃
Ci∈CN Ci = C and (si : i ∈ N) for players N such that there is an
allocation A′N = (A′i : i ∈ N) to players N with A′i ⊆ Ci and len(A′i) = si for




i = C (thus
∑
i∈N si = 1).
Output: Allocation AN = (Ai : i ∈ N) with Ai ⊆ Ci and len(Ai) = si for each
i ∈ N and
∑
i∈N Ai = C.
sort CN = (Ci : i ∈ N) in a lexicographic order with respect to (βi, αi) and assume
C1 ≤ C2 ≤ · · · ≤ Cn in this lexicographic order;
set A1 = [a1, b1) ⊆ C1 with length s1 such that a1 = α1 and b1 = α1 + s1;
for i = 2 to n do
set Ai = [ai, bi) \
∑i−1
ℓ=1 Aℓ with length si such that [ai, bi) ⊆ Ci and ai is the
leftmost endpoint in Ci \
∑i−1
ℓ=1 Aℓ;
Figure 4 shows an example of solid valuation intervals CN = (Ci : i ∈ N) and (si : i ∈ N)
with
∑
i∈N si = 1 and an allocation AN = (Ai : i ∈ N) obtained by M2. By an argument
similar to one in Proof of Theorem 1 we have the following theorem.
▶ Theorem 3. M2 correctly finds an allocation AN = (Ai : i ∈ N) with Ai ⊆ Ci and
len(Ai) = si for each i ∈ N and
∑
i∈N Ai = C in O(n log n) time. Furthermore, the number
of cuts made by M2 on cake C is at most 2n − 2.
Proof. Since the time complexity O(n log n) and the number of cuts at most 2n − 2 can be
obtained by the same argument as in Proof of Theorem 1, we only prove that M2 correctly
finds an allocation AN = (Ai : i ∈ N) with Ai ⊆ Ci, len(Ai) = si and
∑









































4 [0.1,0.15) [0.45,0.5)A = +
1 [0.15,0.25)A =
6 [0,0.1) [0.5,0.55)A = +
8 [0.8,1)A =




Figure 4 (a) Example of CN = (Ci : i ∈ N) and (si : i ∈ N) with
∑
i∈N si = 1. (b) Allocation
AN = (Ai : i ∈ N) obtained by M2.
Suppose contrarily that M2 could not set Ai ⊆ Ci with length si for some i ∈ N . Let j
be the minimum among such i s and let J = {1, 2, . . . , j}. Of course, j > 1, since we assumed
that there is an allocation A′N = (A′i : i ∈ N) to players N with A′i ⊆ Ci and len(A′i) = si for




i = C (thus C1 = [α1, β1) is of length at least s1 and A1 = [a1, b1) =
[α1, α1 + s1) ⊆ C1). Now we consider valuation intervals CJ = (Ci : i ∈ J). Note that each
Ci = [αi, βi) ∈ CJ satisfies βi ≤ βj , since CN = (Ci : i ∈ N) was sorted in the lexicographic
order with respect to (βi, αi). Thus, M2 could set Ai = [ai, bi) \
∑i−1
ℓ=1 Aℓ ⊆ Ci = [αi, βi)
with length si for each i ∈ J \ {j} but could not set Aj = [aj , bj) \
∑j−1
ℓ=1 Aℓ ⊆ Cj = [αj , βj)
with length sj . This implies that Cj \
∑j−1
ℓ=1 Aℓ is of length s′j < sj . Let
A′′i =Ai (i ∈J \ {j}), A′′j =Cj \
j−1∑
ℓ=1








i of allocation (A′′i : i ∈ J) consists of several maximal contiguous intervals.





i (Figure 5). Thus, b = βj . Define K ⊆ J by
K = {j} ∪ {i ∈ J | A′′i ∩ I ̸= ∅}.
Now we consider valuation intervals CK = (Ci : i ∈ K). Then each Ci ∈ CK is contained in
I, which can be obtained as follows.
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Figure 5 Illustration of I = [a, b) and I ′ = [a′, a).




ℓ = [aj , βj)\
∑j−1
ℓ=1 Aℓ




ℓ = [aj , βj) \
∑j−1





ℓ and a single contiguous interval Cj is contained in the rightmost maximal








ℓ (i.e., Cj ⊆ I); and otherwise (i.e., if A′′j ̸= ∅),








ℓ and a single contiguous interval Cj is contained in the





Now suppose that there were i ∈ K \ {j} such that Ci ∈ CK is not contained in I. Thus,
I = [a, b) is a proper subinterval of [0, b) = [0, βj) (i.e., a > 0) and Ci = [αi, βi) ∈ CK \ {Cj}
contains a point x in [0, b) \ I = [0, a). Let k ∈ K \ {j} be the minimum among such i s
and let xk be a point of Ck = [αk, βk) ∈ CK contained in [0, a) = [0, b) \ I. Note that
Ck ∩ I ⊇ A′′k ∩ I ̸= ∅ since k ∈ K \ {j} ⊆ J \ {j}. Thus, βk ≤ βj and αk ≤ xk < a ≤ a′k < βk
for some a′k ∈ A′′k ∩ I ̸= ∅. Furthermore, since we chose I = [a, b) ̸= [0, b) as the rightmost




i , we have∑
i∈J A
′′
i ̸= [0, b) = [0, βj). Let I ′ = [a′, a) be the rightmost maximal contiguous interval




i (Figure 5). Since Ck = [αk, βk) is a contiguous interval and satisfies
αk ≤ xk < a ≤ a′k < βk, we can choose xk with xk ∈ I ′ ∩ Ck ̸= ∅. Thus, xk ̸∈ A′′k by




i = ∅. Then, however, M2 would have tried to include xk into A′′k




ℓ ⊆ Ck with




ℓ . This is a contradiction.
Thus, each Ci ∈ CK is contained in I and
⋃
i∈K Ci ⊆ I. By the argument above, we have⋃
i∈K



















by the definitions of I and K and A′′i ⊆ Ci for each i ∈ K. Thus,∑
i∈K
len(A′′i ) = s′j +
∑
i∈K\{j}




since s′j < sj . However, this is a contradiction, since we assumed that there is an allocation
A′N = (A′i : i ∈ N) to players N with A′i ⊆ Ci and len(A′i) = si for each i ∈ N and∑
i∈N A
′










Ci) = len(I) = b − a.
Thus, M2 correctly finds an allocation AN = (Ai : i ∈ N) with Ai ⊆ Ci, len(Ai) = si
and
∑
i∈N Ai = C. ◀
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7 Application to Mechanism of Chen et al. [13]
By Theorem 3, in order to obtain an envy-free and truthful allocation AN = (Ai : i ∈ N)
with Ai ⊆ Ci and len(Ai) = si for each i ∈ N and
∑
i∈N Ai = C, we only need (si : i ∈ N)
such that there is an envy-free and truthful allocation A′N = (A′i : i ∈ N) to players N




i = C. Thus, Theorem 3 can
be applied to the mechanism of Chen, et al. [13] where the valuation function vi of each
player i ∈ N is more general and piecewise uniform: Given a cake C = [ 0, 1), n players
N = {1, 2, . . . , n} and solid piecewise uniform valuation functions (vi : i ∈ N) such that
D(vi) = {x ∈ C | vi(x) > 0} of each valuation function vi consists of mi ≥ 1 maximal
contiguous intervals Ci1 , . . . , Cimi in C and
⋃
i∈N D(vi) = C.
The mechanism of Chen, et al. [13] finds an envy-free and truthful allocation A′N =









with A′ij ⊆ Cij for each i ∈ N
and for each j = 1, 2, . . . , mi. Thus, we can set sij = len(A′ij ) and apply Theorem 3 to
obtain an envy-free and truthful allocation AN = (Ai : i ∈ N) such that Ai =
∑mi
j=1 Aij
for each i ∈ N with Aij ⊆ Cij and len(Aij ) = sij for each j = 1, 2, . . . , mi with at most
2(
∑
i∈N mi) − 2 cuts. Note that, we can delete all Cij if sij = len(A′ij ) = 0, and thus, we
can assume sij = len(A′ij ) > 0 for each i ∈ N and for each j = 1, 2, . . . , mi.
In summary, we have the following corollary.
▶ Corollary 4. Suppose that we are given (sij : i ∈ N, j = 1, 2, . . . , mi) such that there is an










with A′ij ⊆ Cij and len(A
′
ij
) = sij > 0 for each i ∈ N and for each
j = 1, 2, . . . , mi for the cake-cutting problem with cake C = [ 0, 1), n players N = {1, 2, . . . , n}
and solid piecewise uniform valuation functions (vi : i ∈ N) such that D(vi) = {x ∈ C |
vi(x) > 0} of each piecewise uniform valuation function vi consists of mi ≥ 1 maximal
contiguous intervals Ci1 , . . . , Cimi in C and
⋃
i∈N D(vi) = C (such A′N = (A′i : i ∈ N)
to players N can be obtained, for example, by Mechanism of Chen, et al. [13]). Then,
Second Mechanism M2 (Algorithm 3) correctly finds an envy-free and truthful allocation
AN = (Ai : i ∈ N) with
∑
i∈N Ai = C and Ai =
∑mi
j=1 Aij with Aij ⊆ Cij and len(Aij ) = sij




i∈N mi) time. Furthermore,
the number of cuts made by M2 on cake C is at most 2(
∑
i∈N mi) − 2. Thus, Mechanism of
Chen, et al. [13] can be implemented to make at most 2(
∑
i∈N mi) − 2 cuts on cake C.
8 Concluding Remarks
We gave a much simpler envy-free and truthful mechanism with a small number of cuts for
the cake-cutting problem posed in [2, 25]. Furthermore, we showed that this approach can
be applied to the envy-free and truthful mechanism proposed by Chen, et al. [13] for the
more general cake-cutting problem where the valuation function of each player is piecewise
uniform. Thus, we can make their envy-free and truthful mechanism use 2
∑
i∈N mi − 2
cuts and settle the problem posed by [2, 25], where mi is the number of maximal contiguous
intervals in D(vi) = {x ∈ C | vi(x) > 0} of each player i’s piecewise uniform valuation vi.
If we require the piecewise uniform valuation vi of each player i to be a single contiguous
interval Ci in cake C, then Modified Mechanism of Asano and Umeda can be implemented
to run in O(n2 log n) time based on parametric flows on the network arising from valuation
intervals Ci [3] (Parametric flows and parametric searching have been studied by many
researchers [1, 17, 33]). We expect this would lead to a faster envy-free and truthful
mechanism for the general piecewise uniform valuations.
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